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A complex interaction of ideological, financial, social, and moral 
factors makes the financial sustainability of health care systems a 
challenge across the world. One difficulty is that some of the moral 
commitments of some health care systems collide with reality. In 
particular, commitments to equality in access to health care and 
to fair equality of opportunity undergird an unachievable promise, 
namely, to provide all with the best of basic health care. In addition, 
commitments to fair equality of opportunity are in tension with the 
existence of families, because families are aimed at advantaging 
their own members in preference to others. Because the social-dem-
ocratic state is committed to fair equality of opportunity, it offers 
a web of publicly funded entitlements that make it easier for per-
sons to exit the family and to have children outside of marriage. 
In the United States, in 2008, 41% of children were born outside of 
wedlock, whereas, in 1940, the percentage was only 3.8%, and in 
1960, 5%, with the further consequence that the social and finan-
cial capital generated through families, which aids in supporting 
health care in families, is diminished. In order to explore the chal-
lenge of creating a sustainable health care system that also supports 
the traditional family, the claims made for fair equality of oppor-
tunity in health care are critically reconsidered. This is done by 
engaging the expository device of John Rawls’s original position, but 
with a thin theory of the good that is substantively different from 
that of Rawls, one that supports a health care system built around 
significant copayments, financial counseling, and compulsory sav-
ings, with a special focus on enhancing the financial and social 
capital of the family. This radical recasting of Rawls, which draws 
inspiration from Singapore, is undertaken as a heuristic to aid in 
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articulating an approach to health care allocation that can lead 
past the difficulties of social-democratic policy.
Keywords: fair equality of opportunity, family stability, health 
care financing, health care savings accounts
I. THE SOcIAL-DEMOcRATIc WELfARE STATE: SIGNS Of A cRISIS
The funding of health care is, in different ways, a challenge across the globe. 
Everyone wants the best of care, although not all want to pay for it. Moreover, 
current forms of health care financing in North America and Western Europe 
may not be financially sustainable. citizens have been promised equal access 
to the best of basic health care, which may be unaffordable for many poli-
ties and is in fact impossible to provide. Given limitations of expertise, the 
best of basic medical care cannot be provided to all. for example, everyone 
cannot have access to those few surgeons who are most skilled in resecting 
abdominal aortic aneurysms, but most must instead make do with those who 
have less than the very best expertise, with consequent, concomitant greater 
morbidity and mortality risks. These challenges, rooted in the finitude of 
financial resources and expertise, are compounded by wide-ranging changes 
in the dominant secular culture of the West, which further challenge the sus-
tainability of social-democratic approaches to the provision of health care. 
Among other things, there are the difficulties associated with the erosion of 
the traditional family and the loss of its social capital. In these reflections, a 
social-democratic polity is stipulatively understood as a polity that conforms 
in its constitutional framework and system of laws to the requirements out-
lined by Rawls in his two principles of justice (Rawls, 1971, 302). A social-
democratic state will therefore be committed to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties, with offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and where social and economic 
inequalities are accepted only insofar as they are to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged. These concerns with equality and equality of opportu-
nity form a major focus of this essay.
In the reflections that follow, basic health care identifies all health care that 
has been shown to be effective to a more-than-minimal extent in lowering 
the risk of early death and/or diminishing, relieving, or at least ameliorating 
major forms of pain and suffering through addressing anatomical (including 
genetic), physiological, and psychological states of affairs that are beyond 
the immediate willful control of the patient or others. for the purposes of 
this essay, medical interventions that have not been established as effec-
tive are not considered basic medical or health care, although no particular 
criteria are presupposed for the establishment of an intervention as effec-
tive. Basic health care when delivered with an enhanced quality that more 
than minimally diminishes mortality risks and/or morbidity is termed better 
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basic health care. Examples of better basic health care would be treatment 
of a malady by a physician whose expertise is clearly better than average 
or access to expensive pharmaceutical or medical devices that more than 
minimally decrease mortality and/or morbidity and that are not provided by 
a polity’s guaranteed health care entitlements to basic health care. Being able 
to avoid a queue for services when a delay of treatment would generally 
produce a more-than-minimal increase in morbidity and/or mortality risks 
would also constitute access to better basic health care. What should exactly 
count as “minimal” is not explored.
The focus of this essay is on rethinking the norms that should guide 
health care allocation. The reconsideration of the normative concerns that 
frame health care policy has urgency, given the financial difficulties beset-
ting many Western social-democratic states. Across the developed world, 
with few exceptions, health care consumes an ever larger percentage of 
the gross domestic product, raising issues about financial sustainability. In 
Western Europe, health care expenditures contribute to the financial crises of 
social-democratic polities. Undoubtedly, the current financial crises besetting 
Western Europe and North America were precipitated by various problems 
in debt markets that were not directly related to the social welfare state. 
However, the financial crises have deep roots in the extensive state support 
of a wide range of entitlements that now constitute a major portion of the 
budgets of Western European and North American states. for example, enti-
tlements constituted 62% of the 2010 US federal budget, 20% was committed 
to social security payments, 21% to Medicare and Medicaid, 7% to benefits 
for federal retirees and veterans, and 14% to unemployment and other wel-
fare entitlements (center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2011). The result 
is that government budgets cannot easily be cut back in response to fiscal 
crises, given commitments to entitlements, including commitments to the 
governmental support of health care.
There is urgency as well to address a concomitant phenomenon: the ero-
sion of the traditional family and the resultant poverty associated with families 
headed by single women. Not only does the erosion of the family generate 
social costs, in the case of health care, it diminishes the social resources of tra-
ditional families to provide informal nursing and other care. “Traditional fam-
ily” is used here to identify a married man and woman who are the parents 
of the family’s children. In response to problems of financial unsustainability 
and to the erosion of the family, the creation of family-oriented health care 
savings accounts is considered in order not only to diminish the contribution 
of moral, demographic, and political hazards to financial unsustainability of 
health care systems but also to maintain traditional families. This recommen-
dation is forwarded through the articulation of an approach to health care 
allocation grounded in a non-Rawlsian vision of justice.
Drawing inspiration from Singapore, a proposal that would allow one to 
address both the problem of the financial sustainability of health care systems 
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and the erosion of the traditional family is advanced. This is undertaken through 
a reconstruction of the normative presuppositions that frame Singaporean pub-
lic policy in these areas. for the purpose of this article, Singapore is understood 
to be committed to aiding its citizens in becoming responsible participants in 
their health care decisions through mandatory copayments, financial coun-
seling prior to hospital admission, the accumulation of capital in a health care 
savings account (i.e., Medisave), and the maintenance of the family. Singapore 
paternalistically requires its citizens to save, encourages an internal locus of 
responsibility, and nurtures the ethos that there is no free lunch. Singaporeans, 
depending on their earnings, must save approximately 36% of their gross sala-
ries, about half of which comes from employers. Singapore’s compulsory sav-
ings policy, and the central Provident fund it created, is focused on enhancing 
self-reliance. The central Provident fund is divided into an Ordinary Account, 
from which one may purchase housing, buy insurance, pay for education, and 
invest to increase capital, a Special Account for retirement, and the Medisave 
Account. The total assets of the central Provident fund in 2011 were S$208 
billion (Singapore central Provident fund, 2012, 23). Given the  background 
confucian ethos of Singapore (fan, 2010, 2011) and the circumstance that 
funds accumulated can be transferred, without tax consequences, to family 
members, the system also favors the maintenance of the traditional family.
Singapore’s success is somewhat remarkable. In the year 1965, 50% of 
health care costs in Singapore were supported by the government; by 2000, 
this had fallen to 25%, with health care costs constituting 4.5% of the gross 
domestic product of Singapore (cheah, 2010). The health outcomes from 
Singapore’s system are quite impressive, with a perinatal mortality rate 
of 2.2 per 1000 births (Lim, 2004, 90) and a life expectancy, in 2010, of 
79.3 years for men and 84.1 years for women (Ministry of Health, 2012). 
The Singaporean public/private partnership in health care financing is built 
around its Medisave program (the funds, 6%–9% from wages, are earmarked 
primarily for costs associated with hospitalization). In addition, there is the 
Medishield program (which is a low-cost catastrophic illness insurance, the 
premiums for which can be paid for out of Medisave, as can the premiums 
of private insurance that offers a Medisave-approved Integrated Shield Plan; 
Joshi and Lim, 2010), as well as Eldershield, a severe-disability insurance for 
the elderly that can as well be paid out of Medisave funds. finally, there is 
the Medifund program, a means-tested public safety net of last resort, and an 
Eldercare fund that subsidizes voluntary welfare organizations caring for the 
elderly. One should note that Medisave covers only 8% of health care costs, 
with another 2% being paid by Medishield and Medifund; 35% of health care 
costs in Singapore are paid by employers, 25% are out of the individual’s 
pocket, 5% are paid by private insurance, with 25% being paid for by the 
government (Lim, 2004, 86). Government funds are expended in subsidizing 
public hospitals and hospital care for those of more limited resources who 
would opt for more spartan care. The private sector accounts for 80% of pri-
mary care but only 20% of tertiary care (Sanyal et al., 2008, 4).
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To enhance responsible choices, there is financial counseling as a part 
of hospital admission in order to help patients and their families to choose 
an appropriate level of treatment. class A treatment in a public hospital, for 
example, includes a bed in an air-conditioned two-bed room with attached 
bathroom, television, telephone, and choice of physician, but without sub-
sidy, and class c treatment enjoys an 80% subsidy, in which case, the patient 
stays in an open, unair-conditioned ward with eight or more beds, and with-
out choice of physician. Because government subsidies are paid directly to 
hospitals, although only 10% of total health care costs are paid by Medisave, 
Medishield, and Medifund, for most Singaporeans these constitute a substan-
tial portion of their actual payments for hospital care. The result is a health 
care ethos that is not structured by a commitment to fair equality of opportu-
nity, and instead incorporates a nonegalitarian altruism. This study explores 
how this approach to health care allocation by eschewing a commitment to 
fair equality of opportunity can maintain financial sustainability and, in addi-
tion, check the erosion of traditional family structures.
This essay argues that the Rawlsian endorsement of fair equality of oppor-
tunity should be rejected, not only because the goal cannot be coherently 
realized, but more fundamentally because the concern for fair equality of 
opportunity crowds out moral commitments to altruism. Pursuing equal-
ity for equality’s sake diverts attention from the importance of focusing on 
ameliorating the suffering of those who have less of some important good or 
service. Rawls’s expository device of the original position is engaged to lay 
out the geography of an alternative approach to the allocation of resources 
for health care through incorporating a different thin theory of the good so 
as to explore how to meet the financial and social crises threatening the 
financial sustainability of health care systems in Europe and North America. 
A thin theory of the good is articulated, which abandons Rawls’s emphasis 
on equality of opportunity. Instead, while recognizing the importance of 
the pursuit of prosperity, this alternative thin theory of the good affirms a 
nonegalitarian altruism and acknowledges the central social embeddedness 
of humans in families. In the light of this normative vision, one can better 
appreciate the attractiveness of compulsory savings over taxation for the 
support of health care, as well as the necessity of avoiding Rawls’s herme-
neutic of suspicion with regard to the family, which suspicion is a direct 
result of his commitment to fair equality of opportunity.
II. cRITIcALLy REcONSIDERING AN ILLUSION
The social-democratic welfare systems of the West have engendered a finan-
cial challenge in which more has often been promised for pensions and 
health care than the available resources can support. The difficulties are in 
great measure rooted in a failure to face honestly the constraints imposed by 
human finitude, human passions, and personal freedom on the egalitarian 
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aspirations of social-democratic public policy. Because most humans are 
interested in living longer, if this is possible, without significant morbidities, 
there are insufficient resources for health care systems that promise the best 
of basic health care to all. The core difficulty is human finitude itself. All 
humans will die, and most will suffer before they die. Given the finitude of 
human resources as well as limited human expertise, and given human free-
dom, even in the most affluent societies, all cannot receive the best of basic 
health care. It is impossible, given the limitation of financial resources and 
expertise (e.g., the highest of surgical skills for the resection of abdominal 
aortic aneurysms), to give the best of basic health care equally to all.
In all social insurance and similar entitlement-based approaches to the 
allocation of health-based resources, there is a moral hazard in that, once 
an entitlement is established, it will tend to be exploited to its utmost. In 
addition, if a health care system depends on taxing those who are well 
and working to pay for those who are sick and/or not working, the system 
will face a demographic catastrophe if there is a significant decline in the 
percentage of the working well. The striking decrease in reproductive rates 
among Western Europeans and North Americans has been tied both to the 
effects of their welfare systems as well as to the emergence of an antinatal 
ethos in which it is no longer taken for granted that men and women will 
marry and have children.1 The result has been insufficient resources for (i.e., 
insufficient payers to support) generous pensions with early retirements, as 
well as for ample publicly supported health care systems. Last, but surely 
not least, socially financed health care systems involve a political hazard, in 
that politicians have an incentive to promise better and more encompassing 
health care benefits in order to advance their political careers, even if the 
available resources are insufficient to pay for those benefits. These factors 
have combined to raise questions regarding the financial sustainability of 
social-democratic welfare systems, as well as to make it difficult to achieve 
anything like equality in access to the best of basic health care. As the quality 
of the general health care system deteriorates, the more there is an incentive 
to find access to better basic health care, making the achievement of equality 
of access impossible.
freedom is incompatible with equality. Humans make bargains and enter 
into projects that lead to the relative advantage of those with financial and/or 
social resources. In particular, humans tend to use their money and personal 
influence to gain access to better basic health care for themselves and for 
those to whom they are most closely bound. As a result, the institution most 
corrosive of equality of outcome, as well as of equality of opportunity, is the 
traditional family. The traditional family tends to be more committed to sup-
porting its members rather than others. In addition, the traditional family has 
social capital on which it can draw in providing informal nursing and other 
support to its own members. Although the traditional family enjoys all of 
these advantages, the traditional family in the West is in the process of being 
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eroded and marginalized due to the character of the support and welfare 
offered by social-democratic states.
In part, the erosion of the traditional family follows from well-meaning 
welfare and other support offered to unmarried women, which has had the 
side effect of encouraging some to reproduce and raise children outside of a 
traditional family structure. Beginning in the 1960s, the United States directed 
energies to eliminating poverty through President Lyndon Johnson’s War on 
Poverty. However, governmental welfare policy undermined the family in 
making reproduction without marriage financially attractive (Moynihan, 1965), 
leading to the emergence of an ethos that encouraged reproduction outside 
of a traditional marriage and led to further poverty (Edin and Kefalas, 2005).2 
considerable evidence exists to show that the structure of many welfare pro-
grams is such that they encourage women to have children outside of marriage 
(this is particularly the case with Aid to families with Dependent children).3 
francis fukuyama provides an overview of this political and social history:
Moynihan’s critique was extended by charles Murray, who pointed to the unanticipated con-
sequences of welfare programs like Aid to families with Dependent children (AfDc), which 
encouraged out-of-wedlock births and contributed to the culture of poverty. This critique of 
AfDc led ultimately to its abolition under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, initiated by the Republican congress and signed by President Bill 
clinton (fukuyama, 2006, 20).
There appears to be a strong connection between the presence of the sup-
port and welfare web of social-democratic states and the decline of the 
traditional family.4 The emergence of families headed by single mothers 
is in most cases strongly associated with fewer resources, including health 
care resources, available for such families (Rector, 2010). This erosion of the 
family, although lamented by many, is celebrated by those who recognize 
that the traditional family substantively undermines equality of opportunity, 
while additionally supporting traditional, patriarchal, and heterosexist ideals 
and relationships.5
In the West, the decline of the traditional family has been dramatic. In little 
more than half a century, there has been a substantive increase in the num-
ber of children born outside of traditional marriage. The rate of out-of-wed-
lock births was probably at 4% through most of American history and was 
such in 1950. The percentage had risen to 10% in the United States in 1970 
and 18% in 1980. The rate in the United Kingdom for 1980 was 11.5%. By 
2000, the number of children born outside of a traditional marriage had risen 
to 33.2% in the United States and 39.5% in the United Kingdom (Thévenon, 
2010, 58–59). Nine years later, in 2009, the rate was 41% in the United States 
and 46.3% in the United Kingdom. There are significant differences tied to 
race in the United States; 36% of whites, 53.2% of Hispanics, and 72.3% of 
blacks were born outside of traditional marriage in 2009; among Asians, only 
17.2% were born outside of traditional marriage (Martin et al., 2011, 46). 
 Fair Equality of Opportunity and the Sustainability of Health care Systems 589
 at Rice U
niversity on January 7, 2013
http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The number of children in Singapore born outside of marriage, one should 
note, is so low as simply to be described as “negligible” (Saw, 2005, 128). 
These changes are complex, but, in general, when combined with the birth 
of fewer children, they contribute to the social and economic burdens of 
social-democratic states.6
III. JUSTIcE AS A POLITIcAL PROJEcT
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has had a major influence on reflections 
concerning the proper structure for health care allocation. This is the case 
despite the fact that Rawls himself never addressed the issue of health care. 
Rawls may in fact have avoided addressing justice in health care, because he 
recognized that issues of health care would have disclosed central difficulties 
with his account of justice. A particular difficulty that health care poses is 
that many losses at the natural lottery, such as early death and severe irre-
mediable disabilities, cannot be made whole. The losses are of a character 
such that no social response can return the person affected to a state on 
a par with that of others. In contrast, with respect to other losses, persons 
can be compensated and often made whole. One can even craft policy that 
renders humans equal in terms of financial and social resources. However, 
such is impossible in the case of losses with regard to health status. Equality 
in health status cannot be achieved for all humans. Nor can health care pro-
vide equality of opportunity for those who die young or have very severe 
disabilities.
Rawls engaged the expository device of the original position to bring 
people to affirm a social-democratic approach to social issues. Through his 
expository device of the original position, Rawls invited one to consider how 
one would establish a society so that one would accept one’s position in 
that society as fair, not knowing in advance what one’s social and financial 
position would be. The choices of Rawls’s fictive contractors are framed by 
a background commitment to having social and financial resources divided 
equally, unless an unequal division would increase everyone’s share, and in 
which no risk is taken to augment one’s share. To establish the general line-
aments of their society, these hypothetical contractors must have at least a 
thin theory of the good and an understanding of appropriate decision mak-
ing. The particular thin theory of the good which Rawls supplied his hypo-
thetical contractors with ranks liberty first, then fair equality of opportunity, 
and then concerns for social and financial resources. This thin theory of the 
good is reflected in Rawls’s two principles:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liber-
ties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
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Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a)  to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, 
and
(b)  attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of oppor-
tunity (Rawls, 1971, 302).
In addition, Rawls constructed his contractors so that they lack envy in order 
to allow his contractors to accept inequalities that arise within the con-
straints set by his first Principle and the requirements of fair equality of 
opportunity, as long as those inequalities also redound to the benefit of the 
least-well-off class.
If one embraced this portrayal of hypothetical decision makers, of con-
tractors in the original position, and attempts to apply it to health care, 
then at the most, the contractors would allow inequalities in access to 
health care only if these inequalities redounded to the benefit of the 
least-well-off, because they, the contractors, might find themselves in the 
worst-off class. However, if the least-well-off were those who die early, 
this would require a massive transfer of health care resources to research 
and treatment in order to ensure that children did not die young but could 
reach at least an average lifespan. Geriatric research and treatment would 
be bypassed in favor of particular areas of pediatric research and treat-
ment. That is, one would, as an original contractor, require that resources 
be used to address the plight of the least-well-off class in health status so 
as to respond to the risk that one would be a member of the class of such 
disadvantaged persons. One can only escape these difficulties through ad 
hoc alterations in the moral rationality that is to guide the hypothetical 
contractors (Daniels, 1985).
Even as he wrote A Theory of Justice, Rawls recognized that his account 
was dependent on a particular thin theory of the good and a particular view 
of rational moral decision making, which account he could not establish as 
canonical through sound rational argument. Rawls appreciated the contin-
gency of his point of departure and of the moral vision he addressed. for 
example, Rawls stated:
for while some moral principles may seem natural and even obvious, there are great 
obstacles to maintaining that they are necessarily true, or even to explaining what is 
meant by this. Indeed, I have held that these principles are contingent in the sense 
that they are chosen in the original position in the light of general facts. More likely 
candidates for necessary moral truths are the conditions imposed on the adoption of 
principles; but actually it seems best to regard these conditions simply as reasonable 
stipulations to be assessed eventually by the whole theory to which they belong. 
There is no set of conditions or first principles that can be plausibly claimed to be 
necessary or definitive of morality and thereby especially suited to carry the burden 
of justification (Rawls, 1971, §87, 578).
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It may be said that the agreement in considered convictions is constantly changing and varies 
between one society, or part thereof, and another (Rawls, 1971, §87, 580).
Because Rawls acknowledged that he was not able to give a universal moral 
account, an account offering a moral view of justice sub specie aeternitatis, 
he had to advance his account in other terms.
fourteen years after A Theory of Justice, Rawls even more frankly admit-
ted that he could not give a context-free account of justice as fairness, or 
for that matter, even a necessary and universal moral account. He explicitly 
stated that he wished to avoid “claims to universal truth, or claims about the 
essential nature and identity of persons” (Rawls, 1985, 223). Instead, Rawls 
acknowledged that he was advancing a particular approach to political struc-
tures, recognizing that his basic moral intuitions “drawn upon in justice as 
fairness are combined into a political conception of justice for a constitu-
tional democracy” (Rawls, 1985, 223). What had been taken by many to be 
a moral account of justice is instead to be accepted as a political account of 
justice that advances particular socio-democratic views, which Rawls char-
acterized as “political liberalism.” As Rawls put it, “political liberalism looks 
for a political conception of justice that we hope can gain the support of 
an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines in a society regulated by it” (Rawls, 1993, 10). The theory of justice 
must be understood in terms of its place within a political project.
Rawls took the political turn in order more plausibly to relocate his norma-
tive claims within a political vision, a social-democratic constitutional agenda, 
to be precise. He did this because he, like Hegel (1770–1831), Richard Rorty 
(1931–2007), Gianni Vattimo (1936—), and others, recognized that one can-
not establish a canonical morality through sound rational argument. Such a 
foundational project would require the equivalent of a God’s-eye perspec-
tive that could disclose or at least endorse a particular content-full view that 
was not the result of sociohistorical contingencies, but rather reflected the 
cosmic order, the deep structure of being, or the will of God (Engelhardt, 
1996, chs. 1–2). Because such a grounding cannot be presupposed in a post-
modern secular culture, any particular affirmation of a particular thin theory 
of the good lacks a conclusive necessity. If one approaches reality in the 
light of an agnostic postulate, then all is regarded as coming from nowhere, 
going nowhere, and for no ultimate purpose. By confronting this state of 
affairs, Rawls realized that his lexical ordering of liberty, equality, and the 
possession of social and economic goods that constitutes the substance of 
his thin theory of the good lacks a universal moral standing or necessity. 
No such content-full view of morality and/or justice could be established as 
canonical without begging the question, arguing in a circle, or engaging an 
infinite regress. It was for this reason that Rawls relocated his claims within a 
political program that reflected his moral intuitions, a program he held was 
likely to carry the day.
592 H. Tristram Engelhardt
 at Rice U
niversity on January 7, 2013
http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
We suppose also that these ideas can be elaborated into a political conception of 
justice that can gain the support of an overlapping consensus. Such a consensus 
consists of all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines 
likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more 
or less just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of justice is that 
political conception itself. Whether justice as fairness (or some similar view) can 
gain the support of an overlapping consensus so defined is a speculative question. 
One can reach an educated conjecture only by working it out and exhibiting the 
way it might be supported (Rawls, 1993, 15).
Rawls continued to advance his moral intuitions, but now located within a 
political narrative that gained objectivity through the supposition that it will 
be vindicated by history.
Rawls’s clear statements on the matter notwithstanding, many of the stu-
dents and followers continued to read him as having offered a moral account 
of justice. They then proceeded to apply Rawls’s account of justice as fair-
ness to health care allocation. The most influential of these applications of a 
Rawlsian theory of justice to health care was developed by Norman Daniels 
(Daniels, 1985, 1996, 2008; Daniels & Sabin 2002). Those who wanted to 
apply Rawls’s account of justice to health care recognized that they needed 
to determine whether the provision of health care was like the protection 
of civil liberties, that is, whether it was tied to protecting liberty, which was 
Rawls’s first social goal (Green, 1976), or instead whether the provision of 
health care is best understood as integral to the pursuit of fair equality of 
opportunity, or in fact whether access to health care is more like access to 
social and economic goods that, according to orthodox Rawlsians, may be 
distributed unequally if this unequal distribution redounds to the benefit of 
the least-well-off. Daniels for his part located the support of health care with 
the support of fair equality of opportunity (Daniels, 1981). Others, however, 
recognizing the major moral, financial, and policy difficulties involved in 
attempting to ensure equality in access to health care or the realization of 
equality of opportunity through health care, placed health care within the 
difference principle, so that inequalities in access to health care would be 
morally acceptable if they redounded to the benefit of the least-well-off class 
(Stern, 1983). In the cases of regarding health care as integral to liberty as 
well as integral to the pursuit of fair equality of opportunity, the view taken 
was that, just as social-democratic states should not tolerate inequalities in 
basic civil liberties or in fair equality of opportunity, equality in the provi-
sion of health care would need to be achieved. Stern’s approach, in contrast, 
would allow inequalities.
A major difficulty remains: it is far from clear what it should mean to 
achieve the equality that liberty and equality of opportunity-based interpre-
tations of Rawls would demand. The problem is that one cannot achieve 
equality in health because of the ways in which disease, disability, and 
early death render persons radically unequal. As already noted, would a 
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commitment to equality require first and foremost spending as much as pos-
sible, as long as there was some amelioration of the suffering and disability, 
as well as some postponement of death among those most severely disabled 
or threatened by early death? It would seem that in a Rawlsian account, the 
focus should be on equality of result in these cases rather than on equality 
of access, because it is differences in health status that deprive such persons 
of equality of opportunity. However, because it is impossible to render all 
equal in terms of span of life, health, and freedom from morbidity, most of 
those who engage Rawls focus on the equality of input. They focus on assur-
ing that none will receive better basic health care when most receive only 
basic health care. There is to be only one menu from which to order basic 
health care, so that one will be prohibited from acquiring better basic health 
care. The difficulty is that once one focuses on input, one will have aban-
doned the original ground for pursuing equality, namely, a concern with the 
circumscribed liberty and/or equality of opportunity of those who die young 
or who are radically disabled.
The focus on input (rather than on outputs of lowered morbidity and mor-
tality, as with the Oregon Plan; Strosberg et al., 1992) also has the difficulty 
that it legitimates an egalitarianism of envy in which one is concerned about 
those who have access to better basic health care, even though (1) a focus 
on how one could as cheaply as possible decrease morbidity and mortal-
ity would be more useful, and even when (2) the circumstance that some 
would have access to better basic health care will not harm those receiving 
only basic health care and may indeed advantage the health status of the 
least-well-off (i.e., through bringing more capital into the health care system). 
When equality is pursued for equality’s sake, law and public policy focus on 
preventing some from access to more and better health care, even if no one 
is harmed by having better basic health care. Also, once one moves the focus 
from output to input, one has embraced a genre of egalitarian concerns that 
is no longer focused on the plight of the least-well-off as such, but rather 
on equality as such. Once the focus is on equality as such, or for that matter 
equality of opportunity, one will also be distracted from asking the scientific 
question as to how one can as cheaply and efficiently as possible advantage 
those with limited lifespan and significant disability, even when this does not 
lead to an equality of outcome.
In stepping away from a moral account of justice as fairness to a political 
account, Rawls did not need explicitly to address these puzzles regarding 
health care allocation. This is not to claim that Rawls would not be com-
mitted to an egalitarian, one-tier health care system, somewhat as canada 
once possessed. It is rather to note that how one shapes the character of 
such a system will be a matter guided by the politically reasonable, not the 
morally rational. One is brought then to the conclusion that Rawls himself 
recognized the particularity and contingency of his particular thin theory of 
the good (Rawls, 1971, §60, 395–399) and, therefore, of his two principles 
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of justice (Rawls, 1971, §46, 302–303), along with the difficulties of applying 
them to health care.
IV. THE fAMILy VERSUS fAIR EqUALITy Of OPPORTUNITy
A cardinal tension remains to be examined. In constructing his account of 
justice, Rawls appealed to persons as members of families while also rec-
ognizing that a commitment to fair equality of opportunity brings the family 
itself into question. On the one hand, the hypothetical contractors, by think-
ing of themselves as heads of families, allowed Rawls to give a ground for 
them to be committed to the best interests of their descendants and thus to 
the just savings principle. He engaged with implicit approval the truth that 
families tend to be interested in their own future members.
[W]e may think of the parties [in the contractual circumstance of the original posi-
tion] as heads of families, and therefore as having a desire to further the welfare of 
their nearest descendants. As representatives of families their interests are opposed 
as the circumstances of justice imply. It is not necessary to think of the parties as 
heads of families, although I shall generally follow this interpretation. What is essen-
tial is that each person in the original position should care about the well-being of 
some of those in the next generation (Rawls, 1971, §22, 128).
The family here plays for Rawls a positive role in terms of making intergen-
erational savings integral to justice as fairness.
However, Rawls clearly also appreciated that the very characteristic that 
makes the family essential to legitimate his intergenerational savings also 
makes the family the enemy of fair equality of opportunity. first, he pos-
sessed a moral suspicion regarding the traditional family, in that the tradi-
tional family is qua traditional family patriarchal. He also denied to families 
an area of privacy within which family members could consent to nonegali-
tarian relationships. “If the private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt 
from justice, then there is no such thing…the equal rights of women and 
the basic rights of their children as future citizens are inalienable and protect 
them wherever they are” (Rawls, 1997, 791). This view is articulated against 
the background of Rawls’s sympathy with John Stuart Mill’s criticism of the 
traditional Western family.
Mill held that the family in his day was a school for male despotism: it inculcated 
habits of thought and ways of feeling and conduct incompatible with democracy. If 
so, the principles of justice enjoining a reasonable constitutional democratic society 
can plainly be invoked to reform the family (Rawls, 1997, 790–91).
The traditional family for Rawls brings along baggage from the past that he 
held ought to be abandoned.
Second, and more fundamentally, as already noted, Rawls was critical 
of the family for the very reason that the family was useful in justifying 
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intergenerational obligations. Because families are concerned with their own 
members, they advance the interests of their family in preference to the 
interests of others, thereby undermining fair equality of opportunity. Rawls 
therefore acknowledged that “the principle of fair opportunity can be only 
imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists” 
(Rawls, 1971, §12, 74). As to what to do about the family, Rawls waffled. He 
recognized that he had a basis to argue that the family ought to be abolished, 
yet he stepped back from actually calling for its abolition.
The consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires us to view 
persons independently from the influences of their social position. But how far 
should this tendency be carried? It seems that even when fair opportunity (as it has 
been defined) is satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between individu-
als. Is the family to be abolished then? Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, 
the idea of equal opportunity inclines in this direction. But within the context of the 
theory of justice as a whole, there is much less urgency to take this course (Rawls, 
1971, §77, 511).
Given his commitment to fair equality of opportunity, Rawls should have 
explicitly held that ceteris paribus, the family should be abolished.
finally, Rawls’s theory of justice is also implicitly aimed against the family, 
in that, save for the hypothetical contractors being concerned for their future 
generations, his contractors and actual citizens are conceived of as bare 
individuals whose liberty, equality, and prosperity are realized in individual 
terms. Their status is first as citizens, not as family members or members 
of other intermediate institutions. Rawls is importantly noncommunitarian 
in considering persons first and foremost as citizens of the state. No social 
structure has independent standing or authority between the individual and 
the state. The result is that a Rawlsian social welfare system, including its 
approach to health care, aims at aiding individuals apart from their location 
within families. In fact, the social welfare system in a Rawlsian polity, in 
order to support the flourishing of individuals, would be structured so as 
to enable persons to leave their families easily. It is not an accident that the 
modern social welfare state is highly associated with the contemporary ero-
sion of the family.
V. REcONcEIVING JUSTIcE IN HEALTH cARE: SOME SINGAPOREAN 
REfLEcTIONS
As a cluster of moral intuitions held together as a freestanding moral narra-
tive, Rawls’s account of justice as fairness generates puzzles, collides with a 
major social institution (i.e., the family), and does not provide a basis for a 
financially sustainable health care system. core to the difficulties is the com-
mitment to fair equality of opportunity. One is then led to the question as 
to whether one can envisage a thin theory of the good that would be more 
596 H. Tristram Engelhardt
 at Rice U
niversity on January 7, 2013
http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
promising to guide in erecting health care policy. To explore this possibility, 
this essay now turns to examining what it would mean to understand justice 
in health care, drawing on some Singaporean insights. This reconceiving of 
justice in health care involves laying out the normative underpinnings of the 
Singaporean approach to health care financing in order to better meet the 
financial challenges to the sustainability of health care systems, as well as 
to address the erosion of the family. What is offered should be understood 
as a particular possible reconstruction of the background thin theory of the 
good that underlies Singaporean health care policy as a heuristic for health 
care policy.
The claim is not to have reconstructed Singaporean health care policy 
in all its particularities. Instead, the goal is to have made explicit the cardi-
nal commitments that have allowed Singapore to devise a financially sus-
tainable approach to health care through which it has (1) provided good 
health care to its citizens at a remarkably low cost, (2) accumulated capi-
tal for Singaporeans and Singapore, (3) framed an approach to retirement, 
health care, and other needs of its citizens, while (4) not having eroded, and 
apparently even supported, the traditional family. An element essential to 
the Singaporean approach is that it does not pursue equality or equality of 
opportunity as an independent guiding norm or goal. Instead, goals such as 
a family-centered self-reliance and economic independence are given prior-
ity. In addition, the culture of Singapore, reflecting confucian culture gener-
ally, acknowledges that the usual and biologically natural original locus of 
persons is the family (fan, 1997).
One can better appreciate the background normative commitments of 
Singapore’s view of justice as fairness if one recognizes that an original posi-
tion that would function as an expository device to lay out the commitments 
of Singapore would populate its original position with hypothetical contrac-
tors, guided by a thin theory of the good quite different from that of Rawls. 
Their thin theory of the good would place the protection of personal life and 
property first, the security of families second, and the pursuit of prosperity 
(the increase of financial and other social resources) third, while also being 
guided by a nonegalitarian altruism, reflected in Medifund, that supports offer-
ing basic health care to the impecunious. In all of this, there would be no 
moral concern for equality or equality of opportunity as an independent moral 
goal. Very importantly, like Rawls’s contractors, the Singaporean contractors in 
the original position would think of themselves as “as heads of families, and 
therefore as having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest descendants” 
(Rawls, 1971, §22, 128). But very much unlike Rawls, there is no hermeneu-
tic of suspicion regarding the family, because there is no affirmation of fair 
equality of opportunity. Therefore, the Singaporean hypothetical contractors 
can support the establishment of public policy, including health care savings 
accounts, in ways that can strengthen the integrity of the family.
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Given these background normative commitments, and given the generally 
poor track record of governments in preserving earmarked funds for pen-
sions and the support of health care, the Singaporean reliance on compul-
sory savings rather than only taxation becomes a compelling policy choice. 
In the absence of egalitarian constraints, the fact that some will have saved 
more in their Medisave accounts than others is quite acceptable, as long 
as the system benefits those who participate and makes provision for the 
impecunious. Singaporean moral commitments allow law and public policy 
to avoid focusing on equality itself, and instead to direct energies guided by 
nonegalitarian altruism toward blunting harms associated with persons lack-
ing important goods and services. It is the suffering associated with lacking 
crucial goods and services, not the inequality itself, that is the focus of moral 
concern.
Since its founding, Singapore has pursued security of life, property, and 
families, as well as the achievement of prosperity. Among the consequences 
is that property rights are more basic than civil rights. In addition, in the 
absence of an independent concern for equality or equality of opportunity, a 
nonegalitarian altruism toward others can be affirmed without making impos-
sible promises (e.g., that all will have equal access to the best of basic health 
care) or warranting a hermeneutic of suspicion against the family. Among the 
various results of this nonegalitarian ethos is the accumulation of Medisave 
funds (only about one-sixth of which is expended per year for health care 
costs, the remaining being saved).7 This commitment to compulsory savings 
has helped to blunt the force of the moral, demographic, and political hazards 
that have challenged the health care systems of Western Europe and North 
America. In addition, the circumstance that in Singapore the funds acquired 
can be used for all family members helps to maintain the family as a signifi-
cant intermediate social institution. It may very well be the case that in order 
to have health care savings accounts most effectively contribute to the main-
tenance of family structures, other provisions may need to be incorporated in 
order to transform health care savings accounts into effective family-oriented 
health care savings accounts. This may mean erecting financial penalties for 
divorce in Singapore, where the divorce rate in 2011 is still at the low level of 
7.5% (Department of Statistics Singapore, 2011).8
An important question remains: can one get to Singapore from either 
Western Europe or North America? Given the embeddedness of Western 
European and North American welfare and health care systems in social-dem-
ocratic assumptions and commitments, can enough of Singapore be acquired 
by Western European and North American polities so as to secure greater 
financial sustainability and to check the erosion of the family? Depending on 
circumstances in other polities, were other polities to adopt this approach, 
it would be necessary to judge in terms of their own circumstances what 
amount of reliance on compelled savings will be sufficient in order to change 
the ethos of the health care system. could Singapore’s success be imported 
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elsewhere? At bottom, this is an empirical, social-political question, which 
only real-life attempts can test. Any attempts to import the virtues of Singapore 
to other polities will require eschewing John Rawls’s thin theory of the good 
and its commitment to fair equality of opportunity and instead embracing the 
Singaporean commitment to self-reliance, albeit through compulsory savings, 
its affirmation of the family, and its embrace of nonegalitarian altruism.
NOTES
 * This paper has as a distant ancestor “Engelhardt (2012),” which was itself derived from a 
more distant ancestor, a presentation in Jinan, china, on December 9, 2011, “Health care financing: 
A Philosophical Reflection,” Keynote Address, Healthcare Savings Accounts, Healthcare System Reforms, 
and confucian Bioethics International conference.
 1. for a reflection on an antinatal reproductive ethos, which puts the burden of proof on those 
deciding to reproduce, see Overall (2012).
 2. for an overview of some of the issues associated with the new reproductive ethos, see Rector 
(2010). for further reflections of these changes in reproductive ethos and their wide-ranging implications 
for the social-democratic welfare state, see Anzenbacher (2002), Baumgartner (2003), Blome (2009), Eid 
(1982), and Grandits (2010).
 3. See Moynihan (1965) and Wilson (1988), as well as cherry’s (2011a) exploration of the ways in 
which private charity, in contrast to social welfare entitlements, tends to support the good of the family.
 4. This is not to claim that families produce only benefits and no costs. families impose costs on 
persons, just as do states. Those suspicious of the family note, for example, the amount of child and 
spouse abuse that occurs within families. However, the existence of some abuse does not itself justify 
setting the integrity of the family aside. Given the importance, one judges, that autonomy and integrity of 
the traditional family have, one will variously establish the onus probandi for intrusions into the family.
 5. for an examination of the good associated with marriage and family, see cherry (2011b).
 6. There are data to indicate that children raised by single mothers, and even children raised by their 
biological but unmarried parents, have more difficulties and are therefore more likely to impose costs on 
society beyond the association between being a single mother and poverty (Rector, 2010). for example, 
No matter what the outcome being examined – the quality of the mother-infant relationship, exter-
nalizing behavior in childhood (aggression, delinquency, and hyperactivity), delinquency in adoles-
cence, criminality as adults, illness and injury in childhood, early mortality, sexual decision making 
in adolescence, school problems and dropping out, emotional health, or any other measure of how 
well or poorly children do in life – the family structure that produces the best outcomes for children, 
on average, are two biological parents who remain married. Divorced parents produce the next-best 
outcomes. Whether the parents remarry or remain single while the children are growing up makes 
little difference. Never-married women produce the worst outcomes. All of these statements apply 
after controlling for the family’s socioeconomic status (Murray, 2012, 158).
Drawing on data from, inter alia, Aronson and Huston (2004) and Brown (2004), Murray advances a 
further overview of the effects of children born outside of a traditional marriage.
The differences begin in infancy, when most of the cohabiting couples are still living together and 
the child has a two-parent family. Stacey Aronson and Aletha Huston used data from a study of early 
child care conducted by the National Institute of child Health and Human development to assess the 
mother-infant relationship and the home environment for children at ages 6 months and 15 months. 
On both measures and at both ages, the children of married couples did significantly better than the 
children of cohabiting parents, who in turn had scores that were only fractionally higher than the 
children of single mothers. . . . The disadvantages of being born to cohabiting parents extend into 
childhood and adolescence, even when the cohabiting couple still consists of the two biological 
parents. Susan Brown used the 1999 cohort for the National Survey of America’s families to examine 
behavioral and emotional problems and school engagement among six- to eleven-year-old children 
and twelve- to seventeen-year-old teens. Same story: Having two unmarried biological parents was 
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associated with worse outcomes than having two married biological parents, and the outcomes were 
rarely better than those for children living with a single parent or in a ‘cohabiting stepparent family’ 
(Murray 2012, 164–165).
 7. In 2001, annual health care expenditures were S$4.5 billion, with S$28 billion in the Medisave 
account (Lim, 2004, 86). By 2005, Medisave had risen to S$34.76 billion (Koh et al., 2008, 49). further, by 
2005, the assets of the central Provident fund amounted to S$120 billion (Koh et al., 2008, 43).
 8. The Singaporean affirmation of the traditional family is reflected in many parts of Singaporean 
culture and law. See in particular AAG v. Estate of AAH¸ deceased (2009) SGcA 56, where the court held 
that an illegitimate child could not claim maintenance from the estate of a deceased parent. An editor of 
the Singapore Law Review, in commenting on this case, opined: “In some way, someone must suffer for 
someone else’s gain. Denying the illegitimate child maintenance may be unfair, but to accord it to him 
may ironically be to visit upon the legitimate child the sins of his father!” (Junhui, 2010).
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